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Employee and Director Accountability to Shareholders:
Doing Business for Business Owners
Andrew B. Cripe1
When priests are more in word than matter;
When brewers mar their malt with water;
When nobles are their tailors' tutors;
No heretics burned but wenches' suitors;...
Then shall the Realm of Albion
Come to great confusion.
William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 3, Scene 2.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a decade in which many businesses were manipulated for
quick stock market gains, too many unscrupulous business managers
have largely escaped unscathed, and often times, enriched, from the
fallout from their mismanagement and abuse of shareholder confi-
dence. Meanwhile, the investors who placed their hard-earned equity
in such failed businesses have begun to feel a burning sensation not
unlike that "wenches' suitors" commonly experience.2 With confused
investors struggling to make sense of financial statements marred by
accounting irregularities, the senior officers of certain publicly traded
companies must now attest to the accuracy of their financial reporting
and accounting practices under oath and the threat of civil and crimi-
nal sanctions under the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(also referred to as the "Act"). 3
Accountability for financial reporting under the Act is being placed
squarely at the top of the corporate chain of command; on the shoul-
1. Andrew B. Cripe is an associate attorney at the law firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson in
Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Cripe received a J.D., cum laude, from Loyola University Chicago School
of Law in 1997 and a B.A. from the University of Minnesota in 1994. The views expressed in this
article are only intended to reflect the views of the author and are not necessarily the views of
Hinshaw & Culbertson or its clients.
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 3, sc. 2.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 29, 18, 11, and 28 U.S.C.A.); see also SEC File No. 4-460: Order Requir-
ing the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, available athttp://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm.
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ders of the chief executive and financial officers of the company. 4 No
CEO or CFO, however, can have personal knowledge of every aspect
of business encompassed in a company's financial reporting and ac-
counting practices. Just as shareholders necessarily rely on informa-
tion that managers provide, managers rely on information and advice
that subordinates provide. This fact has lead to a curious phenome-
non, whereby managers and directors of failing companies have at-
tempted to explain reporting irregularities by passing blame down the
chain of command, in a sort of reverse Nuremberg defense. 5 The Act
appears aimed at eliminating this defense by giving senior corporate
officers a strong incentive to take steps to ensure that all links in the
corporate chain of command are committed to faithfully serving the
interests of shareholders.
It is at this point that corporate officers and directors could learn
from Shakespeare's tragedy of King Lear.6 Sitting in a royal court
more accustomed to self-serving flattery and hyperbole than plain-
spoken honesty, the egotistical King Lear invites his three daughters
to compete for his affection and their respective shares of his king-
dom. The aging King, who is planning for his retirement, proposes
splitting his kingdom in thirds, with the best portion going to the
daughter who professes the greatest love for the King. Daughters
Goneril and Regan profess that their love for their father exceeds
their love for all else, husbands included. The third daughter, the vir-
tuous Cordelia, speaks plainly, "I love your Majesty according to my
bond, no more, nor less." Dissatisfied with this lack-luster response,
Lear implores Cordelia to follow her sisters' example and profess a
love that defies limits. Again, Cordelia states that her love is true, but
not without limit; she will share her love equally between her father
and the man that she may someday marry. An enraged Lear harshly
rebukes Cordelia, casting her out of his good graces and fortune: "Thy
truth then by thy dower." Lear's misjudgment proves costly, as a dy-
ing Lear finds himself penniless and imprisoned at the hands of his
loving Goneril and Regan, to whom he has foolishly given his entire
kingdom.
4. See SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Idea of "Good"
Governance, Speech Before the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Washington, D.C.,
(Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch586.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2003).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.
2002, at 106. "Practically everyone involved has pointed the finger of blame at others or pro-
claimed his or her ignorance as a badge of honor." Id. at 112-13.
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
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The royal court of Shakespeare's King Lear is not entirely unlike
the boardrooms, offices and hallways of corporate America today. In-
dividuals often compete and are rewarded according to their ability to
promise and report results that defy limits. Promised or reported re-
sults and actual results, we are daily reminded, may be entirely differ-
ent matters. Top executives hoping to avoid a fate similar to that of
Shakespeare's King Lear (i.e., financial ruin and imprisonment)
should be mindful of the perverse incentives that may reward individ-
uals who, like Goneril and Regan, deliver only self-serving and empty
promises. As King Lear learned too late in life, plainspoken honesty
should be embraced and rewarded, not punished.
II. THE EMPLOYEE AND DIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY AUDIT
A. Background
In recent years, companies (and their insurers) have faced an in-
creasing number of lawsuits by employees, customers, shareholders
and the general public alleging unlawful practices on a company-wide
basis. Claims alleging everything from securities fraud7 to conspira-
cies to harm the environment and public health have prompted many
companies to re-examine their corporate policies and practices. As a
result, many companies have wisely adopted 'best practices' policies
and instituted regular audit and other compliance programs intended
to enforce those policies. Businesses in certain industries subject to
close government regulation, such as nuclear power generators and
health care providers, have long utilized even more aggressive compli-
ance programs.
'Best practices' policies typically include detailed ethics rules and
codes of conduct for individual employees (management included)
and directors. However, these written policies and the compliance
programs aimed at enforcing those policies, or general notions of
"corporate social responsibility," have not necessarily proven suffi-
cient to guard against corporate disaster.8 In fact, many of the recent
highly publicized corporate scandals have involved companies with
very detailed ethics policies, codes of conduct, mission statements and
mottoes. For example, Enron's very thorough code of conduct alleg-
7. The year 2002 is on track to be a record year for securities fraud actions. See Sean Higgins,
Shareholder Suits Near A High Despite '95 Reform Legislation, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept.
10, 2002, at Al.
8. See Milton Moskowitz, What Has CSR [Corporate Social Responsibility] Really Accom-
plished? Much of the Movement Has Been a Public Relations Smokescreen, Bus. ETHICS, May/
June & July/Aug. 2002, at 4 ("Looking over the history of corporate social responsibility, I can
see it has consisted of 95 percent rhetoric and 5 percent action.").
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edly included statements such as, "Relations with the Company's
many publics - customers, stockholders, governments, employees,
suppliers, press and bankers -- will be conducted in honesty, candor
and fairness." 9 Written ethics policies have, therefore, often served
only as "paper tigers," though they have occasionally been of some
use in defending claims of company-wide malfeasance (i.e., by evi-
dencing the company's objection to certain conduct) and in marketing
materials intended to impress "socially conscious" customers and
investors.' 0
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted on July 30, 2002, in response
to the failure of many corporations to effectively police and enforce
their existing policies and otherwise ensure good corporate govern-
ance. The express purpose of the Act is to "protect investors by im-
proving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.""1 In addition
to setting new guidelines for a chief executive officer's certification of
financial statements and for maintaining effective controls and proce-
dures to ensure complete and accurate disclosures to shareholders, the
Act contains a number of other provisions intended to address some
of the issues that recent corporate scandals have raised, including: (1)
the oversight of public accounting firms; (2) conflicts of interests in-
volving securities analysts; (3) prohibitions on loans to insiders; (4)
codes of ethics for senior financial officers; (5) rules of professional
responsibility for attorneys; (6) new insider trading rules and restric-
tions; and (7) new "whistle blower" protections for employees of pub-
licly traded companies who provide evidence of fraud.' 2
Significantly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not establish any new
"safe harbor" provisions for companies and executives who fail to
provide accurate disclosures. To the contrary, the Act creates new po-
tential liabilities for companies and executives alike who fail to be vig-
9. Enron Code of Ethics (July 2000) (republished by the Illinois Institute of Technology,
Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions), available at http://www.iit.edu/departments/
csep/publicWWW/codes/industry.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
10. As evident in the recent California Supreme Court case of Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243
(Cal. 2002), however, investors and customers are becoming increasingly critical of companies
that attempt to use their corporate social responsibility for marketing purposes. In Kasky, the
Court recognized that Nike's statements about its labor policies, practices, and conditions consti-
tuted "commercial speech" that could support a private attorney general action for fraud under
the California Business and Professions Code.
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 29, 18, 11 and 28 U.S.C.A.) (noting the statement of legislative purpose).
12. Id.
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ilant in matters of corporate governance, including the potential for:
(1) forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits; (2) debts being deemed
nondischargeable if incurred in connection with a violation of securi-
ties laws; and (3) criminal punishment.1 3
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is broad in its potential scope, it does
not represent the significant overhaul of existing securities laws and
corporate governance practices many shareholder activists, lawyers,
legislators and others have demanded.14 The Act largely represents
an attempt to add some 'new teeth' to aid in the enforcement of ex-
isting securities laws. A company that simply sets out to ensure com-
pliance with the Act, therefore, will not necessarily ensure that the
problems of the recent past are not repeated.
C. Power of Incentives, Denial and Other Unseen Forces
In a speech at Harvard University, Charles Munger, Vice Chairman
of Berkshire Hathaway, identified "24 standard causes of human mis-
judgment. ' 15 In his speech, Mr. Munger first commented on the
power that incentives have on individual behavior in the business
world:
One of my favorite cases about the power of incentives is the Fed-
eral Express case. The heart and soul of the integrity of the system
is that all the packages have to be shifted rapidly in one central
location each night. And the system has no integrity if the whole
shift can't be done fast. And Federal Express had one hell of a time
getting the thing to work. And they tried moral suasion, they tried
everything in the world, and finally somebody got the happy
thought that they were paying the night shift by the hour, and that
maybe if they paid them by the shift, the system would work better.
And lo and behold, that solution worked.16
13. Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § § 1519-20 and 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (2002)).
14. For example, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise
recently released its first recommendations for improved corporate governance, which included:
(1) retention and direction of compensation experts by compensation committees - not manage-
ment; (2) compensation committees setting compensation not by ratcheting up industry aver-
ages; (3) uniformly expensing stock options; (4) substantial director and top management stock
ownership for extended holding periods; (5) avoiding "special purpose entity" compensation to
executives; (6) greater disclosure of equity dilution and employment agreements; (7) shareholder
approval of option repricing; and (8) advanced notice of executive stock sales. See Press Re-
lease, The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, Corporate
Governance: Commission Calls for Major Compensation Reform (Sept. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.conference-board.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
15. Charlie Munger, Munger On the Psychology of Human Misjudgment, Address at the
Harvard University (estimated date June 1995) (transcript available at www.tilsonfunds.com/
mungerpsych.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2003)).
16. Id.
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As Mr. Munger observed in his speech, there is an inextricable link
between the causes of human misjudgment and the economics of a
business. Incentives (financial and otherwise), personal bias, psycho-
logical denial, the institutional imperative (i.e., following institutional
policies and practices no matter how irrational), peer pressure, undue
influence, fear, envy and greed may all motivate an individual more
strongly than mere mission statements, common sense or a basic sense
of right and wrong. One of the longest running and most thorough
discussions of this subject is contained in the annual reports, letters to
shareholders and owners' manual for Berkshire Hathaway, as well as
the other works of Warren Buffett, Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway,
and Charles Munger. 17 As Warren Buffett once observed about the
unseen forces that cause individuals in a company to engage in de-
structive lemming-like behavior:
Most managers, have very little incentive to make the intelligent-
but-with-some-chance-of-looking-like-an-idiot decision. Their per-
sonal gain/loss ratio is all too obvious: if an unconventional decision
works out well, they get a pat on the back, if it works out poorly,
they get a pink slip. Failing conventionally is the route to go; as a
group, lemmings may have a rotten image, but no individual lem-
ming has ever received bad press.' 8
While the complexities of human behavior may never be fully un-
derstood, it is clear that behavior will not change simply by virtue of
compliance initiatives that ignore the impact of these unseen forces on
day-to-day business operations. Just as Cordelia was a rarity in the
Court of King Lear, Enron's Sherron Watkins, who signed a letter
warning that the company was at risk of "implod[ing] [due to] a wave
of accounting scandals,"' 9 is a rarity in the corporate world.
D. Accountability Audit Objectives
To ensure that all individuals in the corporate chain of command
work in a manner reasonably calculated to grow a business capable of
generating a sustainable return on shareholder equity,20 companies
17. In the interest of full disclosure, the author is a shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway.
Nothing in this paper, including any references to the writings and works of Warren Buffett and
Charles Munger, should be construed as an endorsement of any particular investment decision.
18. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., SHAREHOLDER LETTERS (1984), available at http://www.
berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
19. See Stephen J. Hedges & Melita Marie Garza, Lawyers' Report Says Probe Was Curtailed,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 2002, § 1, at 1.
20. For purposes of this paper, a sustainable return on shareholder equity refers to an increase
in the intrinsic value of the business as opposed to a momentary spike in share price as a result of
market fluctuations or momentum. Intrinsic value can be defined as "the discounted value of
cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life." BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.,
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must look beyond merely defending the type of claims raised in the
last lawsuit and beyond vaguely defined compliance initiatives aimed
at achieving "corporate social responsibility" or technical compliance
with securities laws. Specifically, management should thoroughly re-
view how individual employees (management in particular) and direc-
tors are, or are not, held accountable to the shareholders they are
supposed to serve, whether through incentives, fear, past behavioral
reinforcement or otherwise.
An accountability audit cannot fix a company that lacks a sound
business plan or that is lead by an incompetent, apathetic, or self-serv-
ing board of directors and/or management team. It is up to the indi-
vidual investor to avoid these traps. At best, an accountability audit
can only help a company to keep unscrupulous individuals in check
and people of good intentions from going astray by:
1. Exposing actual or potential conflicts of interest;
2. Evaluating whether conditions within the company and the in-
terests of employees and directors (e.g., compensation, profes-
sional advancement or survival, etc.) are aligned with the
interests of shareholders (return on equity);
3. Studying past incidents involving or indicating possible ques-
tionable or unethical conduct to see whether the root causes of
that conduct have been candidly acknowledged and appropri-
ately addressed so that the problem will not be repeated; and
4. Evaluating the sufficiency of existing compliance programs,
safeguards and disclosure controls.
Thus, the purpose of the accountability audit is not to replace ex-
isting regular financial audits and legal compliance programs, but to
enhance them by providing individuals at all levels in the organization,
particularly those who are best able to spot problems, with the willing-
ness and ability to bring issues to the attention of those necessary to
address them. Toward that end, the audit must identify perverse in-
centives or conditions within a company that may impact the informa-
tion provided (or not provided) to management, legal and financial
auditors, shareholders and government regulators. The accountability
audit should further aid in developing or enhancing an internal
"smoke alarm" system, through which individuals in the corporate
chain of command will alert management, auditors, shareholders or, if
necessary, government regulators of potential problems before it is
too late.
AN OWNER'S MANUAL 7 (1996), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/1996ar/manual.
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
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E. Selecting the Auditor
Just as the integrity of a financial audit largely depends on the integ-
rity and independence of the financial auditor, the quality of an ac-
countability audit will largely depend on the integrity, skill and
independence of the person, or persons, charged with performing the
audit, whether on a formal or informal basis.21 A board of directors'
audit or disclosure committee, parent or holding company, major
shareholder, or some other designated individual or group of individu-
als with the time, expertise, objectivity, independence, and authority
to do the job effectively, could competently perform such an audit
internally.
With the caveat that "[t]o the man with a hammer, every problem
tends to look pretty much like a nail,"22 a company conducting an
accountability audit could benefit from the assistance of outside legal
counsel. 23 First, an accountability audit could be efficiently under-
taken in connection with an effort to ensure technical compliance with
the many new rules and regulations contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. As demonstrated below, many of the areas of inquiry relevant to
an accountability audit would also need to be reviewed and addressed
in connection with ensuring compliance under the Act.
Second, an accountability audit would likely raise significant legal
issues requiring legal advice beyond those issues arising under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other existing securities laws. For example,
an obvious source of information for identifying potential accountabil-
ity issues within an organization would be past, present or threatened
lawsuits, regulatory actions and other legal proceedings. As one court
wisely observed, "[a]s always when we are required to predict likely
human behavior, the bases for that predication must lie in past con-
duct."' 24 As discussed in greater detail below, an analysis of a com-
pany's claims experience may help identify common and problematic
themes underlying or causing alleged misconduct-i.e., a particularly
overbearing individual, employees failing to openly identify issues for
fear of reprisal, compensation plans that reward individuals for
achieving easily manipulated targets (e.g., earnings per share), etc.
Third, outside counsel would be able to engage in candid and privi-
leged communications with certain individuals, within the corporate
21. See e.g., Donna Howell, Integrity Is Among Qualities to Look for in an Outside Auditor,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 3, 2002, at A4.
22. Munger Address, supra note 15.
23. See, e.g., Donna Howell, It's the Law: Attorneys Do More Than Get Firms out of Jams,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, May 29, 2002, at A4.
24. Armstrong v. Chicago Park Dist., 117 F.R.D. 623, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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client, concerning potential legal issues and solutions. As one court
noted, "[b]y allowing confidentiality of the substance of client and
lawyer discussions, the privilege is held by clients as a means of en-
couraging their candor in discussing their circumstances with their
chosen legal representatives. '25 Since the primary purpose of the ac-
countability audit is to encourage candor at all levels, it naturally fol-
lows that candor should be encouraged and protected in conducting
the audit. The attorney-client privilege would, therefore, be a signifi-
cant tool in performing an accountability audit. Likewise, the attor-
ney work product doctrine would help protect the unwanted
disclosure of sensitive information that the attorney prepares. An ac-
countability audit performed in the absence of these attorney-client
protections could potentially create discoverable evidence supporting
the claims of potential litigants or government regulators, without
yielding the sort of candid information that a company would need to
implement effective reforms.
F. Managing the Audit
In utilizing the services of an auditor/outside counsel in connection
with an accountability audit, a company should, at a minimum, con-
sider the following issues:
1. Is the proposed law firm involved in any transactions or other
engagements with the company that could impact the firm's
own objectivity or independence?
2. How and by whom will the law firm be paid for its services in
connection with the engagement (e.g., fixed or hourly rate; paid
by company, insurer or other interested party, etc.)?
3. How and to whom will the results of the audit be reported so
that the appropriate corrective action may be taken?
Regarding the first issue, any audit proposal should include a plain
statement from the law firm identifying any actual or potential con-
flicts. For this purpose, the actual or potential conflicts identified
should not be limited to only those "conflicts of interest" that meet
the definition set forth in the ABA's model rules of professional re-
sponsibility.26 The lawyer, or law firm, should also identify other
transactions or engagements for the same client that could impact ob-
25. In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1987) provides in pertinent part that: "(a) A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client ... (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client ......
20031
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jectivity and explain how such potential conflicts will be addressed
(i.e., by building a "Chinese Wall" around the lawyer(s) involved in
the prior engagements). For example, if the law firm in question
wrote the company's stock option or other compensation plan, it
would likely be hesitant to suggest that the compensation plan has in
any manner motivated behavior that is somehow detrimental to the
intrinsic value of the company. Even if the law firm did not determine
the compensation formula, it may have close ties to the person who
did and may not want to criticize that person and risk jeopardizing
future engagements.
Regarding the second issue, an accountability audit should not be
used as a 'gateway' to a never-ending source of professional fees. Un-
fortunately, professional advisors such as lawyers, accountants and
consultants have typically utilized a 'cost plus' contract approach to
billing their professional services, whereby inefficiency and a lack of
focus can be rewarded at an hourly rate. A fixed rate, hourly rate
with a maximum cap, or some other alternative fee arrangement
would be preferable to the traditional hourly billing method and
would help provide outside counsel with an incentive to carefully de-
fine the scope of its involvement in the audit, as opposed to an incen-
tive to audit and collect hourly fees into perpetuity.
One alternative billing method, for example, could involve con-
ducting the accountability audit in connection with the underwriting
of a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy, fidelity bond cov-
erage, or an extension of credit. The corporation would pay a fixed
fee for auditing services that the insurer or lender pre-approves, in
exchange for a reduced insurance premium, lower financing charges
or less restrictive lender covenants, assuming the corporation imple-
ments corrective action in response to areas of concern that the audi-
tor has flagged. The value of the auditor's services could ultimately be
based on the long-term claims experience or default rates of audited
versus unaudited companies. If the auditor fails to make a real dent in
an insurer's claims experience or a lender's default rate, their services
would no longer be approved as a basis for obtaining a premium re-
duction or lowered financing charge.
Third, the audit should anticipate the risk that the recipient of the
report might be connected with a negative item in the audit report,
and may, therefore, be unwilling to take the necessary corrective ac-
tion. As a result, it is important that the report's findings be distrib-
uted as broadly as possible without: (1) destroying any attorney-client
privilege; or (2) disclosing confidential or proprietary information to
[Vol. 1:153
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the general public. 2 7 Thus, it would not be advisable for outside coun-
sel to prepare an audit report for general distribution to the public or
shareholders summarizing privileged communications and/or legal ad-
vice. Even a short statement to shareholders communicating the law
firm's conclusion and advice in connection with the audit, along the
lines of, "The law firm of Dewey, Cheatum & Howe has performed an
accountability audit of Offshore Partnerships Holding Co. and has
found no material areas of concern," could jeopardize the attorney-
client privilege as to materials prepared by, or communicated to,
outside counsel. Moreover, such a disclosure would also put pressure
on outside counsel to issue a 'clean' report that serves a marketing
function, or risk jeopardizing future business with the client.
In order to address these concerns, the findings and advice of
outside counsel in connection with an accountability audit should, at a
minimum, be distributed to all top members of the management team,
including the company's CEO, CFO and general counsel, as well as
the company's board of directors.2 8 Since outside counsel may un-
cover accountability issues that involve management and directors
acting in collusion (or at least, directors acquiescing to management
abuses), the report of outside counsel should also be distributed to
other interested parties pursuant to a 'joint interest' confidentiality
agreement. If the threat of civil and criminal penalties is not enough
to motivate management to take the appropriate corrective action,
these interested parties could exert an additional and independent
pressure to bring about a change in management. Such interested
third parties could include parent companies, acquiring companies,
certain major shareholders, lending institutions or insurers. Indeed,
major shareholders, lending institutions, and insurers would have a
strong incentive to see an effective accountability audit performed, as
they are the ones who usually pay the price for corporate mismanage-
ment. The renowned business scholar, Benjamin Graham, once noted
"[i]t can be stated as a rule with very few exceptions that poor man-
agements are not changed by action of the 'public stockholders,' but
27. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides for the creation of new rules of profes-
sional responsibility for attorneys, including rules: (1) "requiring an attorney to report evidence
of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty ... by the company or any
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company"; and (2)
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the board of directors or an appropriate commit-
tee thereof if appropriate remedial action is not taken by the chief legal or executive officers.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2002)).
28. Id.
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only by the assertion of control by an individual or compact group. '29
Thus, the auditor should, at the outset of the audit, identify and in-
volve any individual or compact group that could assert the necessary
control to change management, if the audit reveals management to be
an area of concern. An auditor should be reluctant to render its ser-
vices in the absence of such an interested third party, as doing so may
tarnish the reputation of the auditor without bringing about needed
change in the company being audited.
Finally, a company should, through its disclosure committee and/or
with the assistance of counsel, prepare a "risk factor" disclosure iden-
tifying potential accountability issues. For example, if employee com-
pensation is based in large part on some form of stock ownership plan,
the report should candidly explain the correlation that may exist be-
tween the company's stock price and individual employee perform-
ance (i.e., depressed stock prices may cause low morale, increased
employee turnover, or poor employee performance). However, care
should be taken to avoid creating documentation that would destroy
any attorney-client privilege, or simply benefit potential litigants, as
opposed to providing shareholders with material information. A can-
did and up-to-date "risk factor" disclosure should aid in the defense of
claims from plaintiffs who may assert that they have been mislead by a
company's forward-looking statements (i.e., expected performance,
goals, etc.).
G. Areas of Inquiry
The accountability audit must be narrowly tailored if it is to be ef-
fective. Moreover, it should not be redundant with existing compli-
ance programs and/or regular financial audits. The accountability
audit should, therefore, not involve the review of every piece of paper
that the company has ever created. Nevertheless, the auditor should
be thorough and consider reviewing information pertaining to the fol-
lowing general areas of inquiry for a specified period of time (i.e.,
three years):
1. Corporate Governance
Major corporate governance documents (i.e., articles of in-
corporation, by-laws, minute books, etc.);
29. BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 270 (4th rev. ed. 1973); see also BENJA-
MIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITIES ANALYSIS 513-14 (1934) ("In such matters the
most impressive and creditable moves are those made by a group of substantial stockholders,
having an important stake of their own to protect and impelled thereby to act in the interests of
shareholders generally.").
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* Identity of all affiliated divisions, entities, partnerships,
ventures, etc.;
" Description of business purpose, business plan, expansion
plans, along with any significant changes in the business
purpose or plan;
* Identity of major competitors;
" Description of any significant earnings or accounting re-
statement along with the basis for the restatement; and
* Description of any significant "one time" charges or write-
offs along with the basis for the charge or write-off.
2. Key Employee and Director Information
* List of all directors, officers, senior management and key
employees along with an organizational chart illustrating
the Company's management structure;
* For each of the foregoing individuals, the following:
- title(s);
- length of service;
- department or place of employment;
- direct supervisors and direct reports;
- copy of C.V. and/or employment application;
- salary, fee, or benefit arrangements;
- copy of any employment or director contract or
agreement;
- statement of how and by whom person was referred
and/or selected;
- describe training received or available in connection
with position;
- describe duties and responsibilities;
provide performance reviews; and
summary of individual stock holdings in company.
3. Compensation and Benefit Plans
* All employee benefit or compensation plans;
* Reports of any compensation committee;
* Schedule showing cost of employee benefit or compensa-
tion plans;
" Actuarial or financial report for all plans; and
" Accounting of incurred and expected costs associated with
any stock option plan.
4. Employee Hiring and Termination Analysis
* Identity of all (or a random sampling of all) employees
hired and/or terminated (whether voluntarily or involunta-
rily) by title, department and direct supervisor;
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* Brief description of circumstances of terminations (i.e.,
"fired - excessive absences;" "quit - new employment op-
portunity," etc.); and
* Copies of all (or a random sampling of all) exit interview
notes, letters of resignation, termination notices.
5. Company Handbook and Policies
* Employment policies, handbooks, training manuals, rules
of conduct, contracts, and at-will employment acknowl-
edgements;
* Standard disciplinary procedures; and
* Collective bargaining agreements, if any.
6. Major Lender or Financing Agreements
" Copies of all material financing agreements, including any
financing covenants (i.e., maintaining minimum book
value, etc.); and
* Identity of any actual or technical defaults, loan workouts
or major debt restructuring, with respect to any financing
agreements.
7. Claims, Litigation and Regulatory Proceedings
* Claims made or threatened against any insurance or bond
coverage;
" Past, present and/or threatened lawsuits, settlement agree-
ments, or binding court orders;
* Government Investigations (i.e., EPA, OSHA, SEC, IRS,
etc.); and
• Private party investigations (i.e., NASD, ISO, etc.).
8. Major Vendor and Customer Information
* Identity of major vendors and customers (i.e., with con-
tracts exceeding specified amount deemed material), in-
cluding the terms of any agreements or understandings,
length of relationship, and identity of any individuals or
companies who either own or control said vendor or cus-
tomer; and
* Description of vendor or customer disputes, defaults or
breaches of contract.
9. Dealings With Outside Auditors and zAdvisors
* Identify outside legal, financial or accounting auditors, in-
cluding a description of nature and scope of all engage-
ments; and
* Copies of correspondence with financial and legal auditors.
10. Dealings With Investment Banks and Analysts
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* Identity of all analysts providing coverage and copies of an-
alyst reports;
* Copies of communications with analysts and policy con-
cerning such communications; and
* Description of all transactions or engagements with invest-
ment banking firms.
11. Disclosures To Shareholders and Public
* Description of existing disclosure controls and action plan,
including any disclosure guidelines, timetables, chart iden-
tifying individual(s) responsible for particular portions of
filings;
" Public filings with SEC;
* Press releases;
" Shareholder information request and response policy;
* Reports or correspondence generated by any disclosure
committee or individual charged with preparing disclo-
sures; and
* Copies of any earnings conference call scripts or
transcripts.
12. Compliance Program(s) Information
* Description of any compliance programs, initiatives and
parties responsible for implementation (i.e., safety inspec-
tor, HR department, general counsel, outside consultant,
etc.); and
" Copies of any recent complaints, concerns or comments or
investigative files relating to such complaints, concerns or
comments.
13. Relationships and Transactions With Related Persons
* Description or copies of all oral or written arrangements
not already identified between the Company and (1) any
current or former shareholder, director, officer, senior
management or employee; or (2) any officer or employee
of any government or governmental department, agency,
or entity owned or controlled by any such officer or em-
ployee; (3) and any auditor, accountant, lawyer or other
professional advisor or any firm associated with such advi-
sor; or (4) any family member of any officer, director or
key employee of the Company or any business owned or
controlled by such family member;
* Details of any loan or transfer of assets between the Com-
pany and any of its shareholders, directors, officers or key
employees;
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* Description of any direct or indirect interest of any direc-
tor, officer or key employee that competes with, conducts
business with, conducts business similar to or has any pre-
sent (or contemplated) arrangement or agreement with
(whether as a customer or supplier) the Company;
" List of any directors, officers or other key employees who
have an interest in the company (including stock or stock
options) or any assets of the company; and
" Insider trading history, along with any pre-clearance trade
requests.
H. Audit Methodology
In examining the foregoing information, the auditor should not at-
tempt to impose a predetermined formula (i.e., specific compensation
packages, compliance programs, etc.) as to what will and will not serve
the best interests of shareholders, though certain basic recommenda-
tions should be applicable to most companies (e.g., requiring advance
notice of executive stock sales, accurately accounting for any equity
dilution, etc.). For example, while an "independent" board of direc-
tors may help keep management honest,30 it may also be so indepen-
dent as to not have any vested interest in the company. In some
circumstances, a very "dependent" board of directors, comprised of
major shareholders who are also key officers of the company, may be
a superior means of achieving accountability to shareholders as they
"eat their own cooking,"'31 so long as potential areas for officer/direc-
tor abuse are adequately addressed (i.e., determination of compensa-
tion). As another example, some have suggested that simply tying
employee compensation to a company stock ownership plan might
produce better results for shareholders. However, as Home Depot
CEO, Bob Nardelli, recently acknowledged, such a plan is not entirely
foolproof, particularly when the general markets bring stock prices
down-"[s]ervice directly relates to morale, and morale in our com-
pany is directly related to stock price."'32
Rather than trying to impose a particular dogma or set of protocols,
therefore, the auditor should strive to view the facts as they apply to
the particular company, withholding any conclusions in advance of a
thorough examination of those facts. In so doing, the auditor should
engage in a two-fold exercise: (1) studying known incidents involving
or indicating possible questionable or unethical conduct (i.e., lawsuits,
30. See, e.g., Sonnenfeld, supra note 5, at 106-13.
31. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., supra note 20, at 2.
32. IBD's Top 10, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept. 9, 2002, at Al.
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claims, regulatory actions, earning restatements, "one time" charges
or accounting write-offs, loan defaults, etc.) to determine whether the
incidents and attending circumstances have been candidly acknowl-
edged and appropriately addressed; and (2) studying existing condi-
tions (conflicts of interests, compensation packages, disclosure
controls, etc.) to identify "areas of concern" where as of yet unknown
incidents may have a likelihood of occurring, or continuing to occur
undetected, in the absence of closer scrutiny. Engaging in this two-
fold exercise requires that the auditor view facts from the perspective
of the individual employees and directors involved in the day-to-day
operations of the company to determine how, or if, perverse incen-
tives or other unseen forces are at work in motivating human misjudg-
ment. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's famous detective, Sherlock Holmes,
best represents this approach: 33
You know my methods in such cases, Watson: I put myself in the
man's place, and having first gauged the man's intelligence, I try to
imagine how I should myself have proceeded under the same
circumstances. 34
You'll get results, Inspector, by always putting yourself in the other
fellow's place, and thinking what you would do yourself. It takes
some imagination, but it pays.35
With this methodology in mind, consider how an accountability au-
dit might address accountability issues at work in the companies in-
volved in the following scenarios:
Example 1:
A computer hardware company "books" tentative third quarter or-
ders as firm orders in the second quarter causing unnecessary over-
time and production costs as employees scramble to produce the
hardware tentatively ordered for the third quarter before the end of
the second quarter only to later disassemble the hardware when the
tentative orders are cancelled in the third quarter.
The acceleration of tentative orders as firm orders and similar quar-
terly sales or revenue boosting slights of hand of varying degrees are,
unfortunately, all too common occurrences. Companies seeking to
boost quarterly sales figures through such practices, however, put
themselves in a precarious position. When, for example, tentative or-
ders booked as firm orders in a prior quarter are cancelled, the cancel-
lations will offset actual firm orders in the current quarter. Thus,
33. See John Price, Ph.D., Sherlock Holmes and the Science of lnvesting, (Sept. 2000), available
at http://www.Sherlockinvesting.com for a detailed discussion of the application of Sherlock
Holmes' investigative methodology in analyzing a company (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
34. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE MUSGRAVE.
35. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURES OF THE RETIRED COLOURMAN.
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management might be later tempted/forced to take even greater liber-
ties with reported facts (i.e., allocating costs to capital improvements
as allegedly occurred at WorldCom). While engaging in this foolish
conduct, the company and its shareholders sacrifice needless labor
and overhead expenses to produce and disassemble goods without any
return on shareholder equity.
While the practice of accelerating orders may not be obvious to fi-
nancial auditors relying on information that management provides, it
most likely is obvious to the employees who are putting goods to-
gether one week only to take them apart the next. Thus, while the
practice is known to some, it would probably not be made known to
the accountability auditor at the outset of the audit, unless a lawsuit,
regulatory action or earnings restatement has called it out into the
open. Nevertheless, the accountability audit should be able to high-
light such potential conduct as an "area of concern" based on the con-
ditions in existence within the company. Toward that end, the auditor
must put himself or herself in the shoes of the employees or directors
and consider some of the possible forces at work:
1. Management is compensated, in part, based on easily manipu-
lated objectives, such as "firm orders;"
2. Employees are not saying anything because the risk of getting
fired or otherwise retaliated against is greater than any poten-
tial benefit to sticking their neck out;
3. The company has no effective mechanism in place for employ-
ees to question the practice;
4. The integrity of the mechanisms in place for correcting such
practices are compromised (i.e., outside auditors will not chal-
lenge "close business questions" for fear of jeopardizing lucra-
tive consulting projects or other engagements, the general
counsel answers to the person(s) who initiated the practice,
etc.); and
5. The board of directors is comprised of individuals with no
vested interest in the company or who simply view themselves
as honorary figureheads engaged in a prestigious resume build-
ing exercise.
Moreover, through further investigation, the accountability auditor
might be able to do more than simply identify manipulation of "firm
orders" as an "area of concern." As noted above, a significant part of
the auditor's job should be to examine the adequacy of internal con-
trols and compliance programs. Aside from simply speculating as to
possible weaknesses in those controls based on known facts (i.e., the
only internal control is the company's general counsel), the auditor
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should engage in random sampling, in the form of interviews with ran-
domly selected employees in each of a company's major departments.
If these employees are provided with a sufficient assurance of confi-
dentiality and are asked the right kinds of questions, they may happily
volunteer the fact that they do not understand why the company
builds goods only to tear them apart again. Again, though, the audi-
tor's primary job should not be to spot problems, but to spot condi-
tions that may motivate the occurrence or reoccurrence of problems
or prevent the discovery of problems. In this scenario, the need for an
enhanced reporting mechanism for employees (i.e., a confidential or
even anonymous hotline directly to a parent company, major share-
holder, insurer, board of directors' audit or disclosure committee, etc.)
should be relatively easy to spot and correcting that deficiency might
well be enough to bring the practice to light and to an end.
Consider another example:
Example 2:
The quality control department of a machine tool manufacturing fa-
cility reports installation and production defects on a monthly basis.
The reports exclude defects that the department does not deem to
be "installation" or "production" related. Thus, if goods are dam-
aged during shipping (by a third party shipping company), they are
not reported as an "installation defect," notwithstanding the fact
that the goods were not defective when produced and do not show
up in the "production defect" records. No record is kept of "ship-
ping related defects." The quality department only reports "pro-
duction" and "installation" defects. All other defective goods are
simply reported as "returned by customer" and are not addressed at
all by quality control.
Again, there could be many possible reasons for why this practice
occurs, in addition to some of those noted above:
1. A change in practice to include a more complete reporting of
defects would make it appear that the quality department is
somehow to blame for there, in fact, being more defects;
2. The quality department is compensated based, in part, on re-
ported defects; and
3. The president of the machine tool manufacturer's brother owns
the shipping company that transports the goods.
Using facts known from the audit, the auditor may not detect the
actual questionable practice (unless it is revealed through random
sampling interviews). However, the auditor would likely have suffi-
cient information to spot "areas of concern," including the manner in
which defects are reported, or the shipping contract is administered, in
light of the president's conflict of interest (i.e., his brother's ownership
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of the shipping company), the method of compensation in the quality
department and/or a general lack of candor in internal
communications.
Finally, consider the following example involving an incident indi-
cating questionable conduct that would likely be made known to the
accountability auditor at the outset of the audit (i.e., through disclo-
sure of a regulatory action):
Example 3:
A distributor of dialysis equipment learns that it has received a ship-
ment of defective dialyzers. Nevertheless, the company's president
decides to sell the dialyzers to the general public. The company's
internal compliance officer, its general counsel, is unable to dis-
suade the president from this course of action. The general counsel
informs the FDA of the possible distribution of defective product.
The FDA imposes severe penalties.
Here, the auditor need not speculate as to possible conduct that
could occur in connection with an "area of concern." The incident has
already occurred-the imposition of FDA sanctions. The auditor
must, therefore, consider whether the incident has been candidly ad-
dressed and corrected so that it will not happen again. Toward that
end, the auditor must consider the possible causes:
1. Exceptional external pressure from the supplier of the dialyzers
(i.e., dependence on a single distributor); and
2. The general counsel had no other person or person(s) to turn to
within the company regarding his concerns.
In this scenario, the importance of the auditor's integrity, indepen-
dence and reporting procedure is clear. For example, if the auditor
were to report only to the president of the company, the audit report
could potentially be of little or no use if the auditor determined that
the underlying problem involved questioning the judgment or integ-
rity of the president.36 If the auditor were courageous or foolish
enough to raise such a question, the report would likely only result in
the termination of any future relationship with the auditor.
This last example also highlights a significant problem in many ex-
isting internal compliance programs. When compliance is left entirely
to the general counsel of a company, that individual will be under a
tremendous pressure to acquiesce to questionable practices. In fact,
the foregoing example is similar to, but not intended to be representa-
36. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, supra note 29, at 510. "All stockholders
seem to take for granted that their management is capable. Yet in selecting stocks, great empha-
sis is laid on the question whether the company enjoys efficient management... Should not this
mean also that the stockholders of any company should be open-minded on the question
whether its management is efficient or the reverse?" Id.
[Vol. 1:153
ACCOUNTABILITY TO SHAREHOLDERS
tive of, the facts in the case of Balla v. Gambro, Inc.37 In Balla, the in-
house attorney was fired after reporting the alleged distribution of de-
fective products to the FDA.38 Following his discharge, the in-house
attorney filed a claim for retaliatory discharge, alleging that his termi-
nation was in violation of public policy (i.e., motivated by his report-
ing the intent to distribute a dangerous product to the general
public).39 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ruled that the in-
house attorney could not assert a legally valid "whistle blower"
claim.40 The Court reasoned that the in-house attorney should not be
afforded the legal protection of a "whistle blower" claim, as he was
already bound to "do the right thing" under the rules of professional
conduct for attorneys.4a Moreover, the Court was reluctant to grant
extra legal protection to in-house attorneys who report possible viola-
tions to government regulators in violation of their ethical responsibil-
ity to maintain client confidences.42 Thus, in-house attorneys in
Illinois and similar jurisdictions face an extraordinary pressure to say
yes or turn a blind eye to questionable practices-if they do not, they
may lose their jobs without recourse. Conversely, it is unusual for an
in-house attorney to be called to task for approving of, or acquiescing
to, a questionable corporate practice, as the practice may go undiscov-
ered or the in-house attorney may effectively protect himself from
professional sanctions through internal documentation. Thus, the in-
house attorney's "personal gain/loss ratio" may often weigh in favor
of approving of, or acquiescing to, questionable corporate conduct.
The areas of inquiry suggested above may reveal many more poten-
tial questionable practices and conditions than the foregoing three ex-
amples are able to demonstrate, such as: (1) Are officers and directors
actively involved or vested in the company, such that they will suffer
consequences (i.e., loss of wealth) for squandering shareholder eq-
uity?; (2) Are managers sacrificing shareholder equity to satisfy "man-
agerial wish lists"' 43 (i.e., foolish expansion plans that are only
calculated to increase the right of executives to higher salaries, power,
prestige, etc.)?; (3) Is executive compensation fully disclosed and in
line with executive performance and overall employee compensa-
37. 584 N.E.2d 104 (I11. 1991).
38. Id. at 106.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 111-13.
41. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
42. Id.
43. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., supra note 20, at 5.
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tion? 44; (4) Are employees able to report issues anonymously or with-
out fear of reprisal?; (5) Are employees motivated by a desire to serve
the long term interests of the business by a strong internal promotion
policy and/or a well constructed compensation plan?; or, alternatively,
(6) Is employee morale and loyalty sacrificed to ineffective compensa-
tion plans and/or high employee turnover?; (7) Is a particular individ-
ual or group of individuals asserting personal goals above the goals of
the company (i.e., return on shareholder equity)?; (8) Are extraordi-
nary conditions testing the limits of human integrity (i.e., dependence
on a single customer or vendor or a high debt load with substantial
lender covenants)?; (9) Is the company making efforts to promote rea-
sonable shareholder expectations in its disclosures?; (10) Is share-
holder equity being surreptitiously diluted through stock option grants
or issues made without any reciprocal capital gain?; and (11) Are
known failures (lawsuits, insurance claims, earning restatements) sig-
nificant and recurring, or are they candidly addressed and resolved?
As Sherlock Holmes observed, the investigator's job requires some
imagination, "but it pays."' 45 Likewise, the accountability auditor's job
should "pay" in the long run for companies seeking to restore investor
confidence and investor capital to the equity markets. While the short
run calculus might seem counter-intuitive (as unearthing fundamental
problems in a company is usually not popular with investors), compa-
nies and top executives should bear in mind two things: (1) harsh civil
and criminal consequences under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be
brought to bear on companies and executives who do not take deci-
sive action to clean house; and (2) "[in the short run the stock market
is a voting machine, but in the long run it's a weighing machine. '46
Eventually, a company should expect that its presently unidentified
problems will weigh down the company's long-term prospects and its
ability to generate a sustainable return on shareholder equity.
III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, intelligent investors, with the aid of government regula-
tors, must protect themselves from unscrupulous businesses and man-
44. In 1934, Graham and Dodd offered the following observation, which is as timely today as
it was then: "In recent years the question of excessive compensation to management has excited
considerable attention, and the public understands fairly well that here is a field where the of-
ficers' views do not necessarily represent the highest wisdom." BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L.
DODD, supra note 29, at 512.
45. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, supra note 35.
46. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., SHAREHOLDER LETTERS (1987), available at http://www.
berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1987.html (Chairman Warren E. Buffet quoting Benjamin Gra-
ham in Buffet's Letter to Shareholders dated Feb. 29, 1988) (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
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agers by carefully selecting their investments based on sound business
principles. In so doing, each individual investor should, to the extent
possible, conduct his or her own informal accountability audit of a
company by considering such basic questions as: (1) How are employ-
ees, executives and directors rewarded/compensated for producing a
return on equity?; (2) What consequences are suffered by employees,
executives and directors for squandering equity?; (3) What is manage-
ment saying or not saying about past mistakes and misjudgments so
that those mistakes and misjudgments will not be repeated?; and (4)
What are the long term objectives of the individuals charged with
managing the business? Finally, investors should consider whether
management is actively considering these same issues or whether
management indulges and rewards self-serving puffery (e.g., King
Lear's Court) in lieu of plainspoken honesty. A formal accountability
audit is only one way that a company can demonstrate to its share-
holders that it is considering these important issues.

